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FREEDOM, REPENTANCE AND HARDENING OF 
THE HEARTS: ALBO VS. MAIMONIDES 
David Shatz 
The doctrine that God hardens some agents' hearts generates philosophical 
perplexities. Why would God deprive someone of free will and the oppor-
tunity to repent? Or is God's interference compatible with the agent's free 
will and his having an opportunity to repent? In this paper, I examine how 
two Jewish philosophers, Moses Maimonides and Joseph Albo, handled 
these questions. I analyze six approaches growing out of their writings and 
argue that a naturalistic interpretation of hardening - as irreversible habit-
uation - has advantages over alternative approaches. This account of 
hardening, however, fits best with the thesis that God does sometimes 
intervene to improve an agent's will. 
When philosophers debate whether free will and moral responsibility are 
compatible with determinism, their discussion rivets on two kinds of chal-
lenges to free will: divine foreknowledge and scientific determinism. 
Although intense controversy rages over whether these factors are compat-
ible with free will and responsibility, some version of the following thesis 
is nonetheless usually accepted by all sides: that, when an agent S inter-
feres directly to affect agent V's motivational system in a way that does not 
involve rational persuasion (brainwashing, hypnosis, and the like), such 
interference will normally preclude V's freely performing and bearing 
responsibility for acts that the intervention caused. But traditional theism, 
including Judaism in particular, seems to allow that at times God does 
interfere directly with people's motivations. Is God's interference compati-
ble with the agent's free will and moral responsibility? If it is not compati-
ble, why would God deprive someone of free will and moral responsibili-
ty? Or does God not really interfere after all? In what follows, I consider 
these questions from the perspective of Jewish philosophy.! 
Two theological doctrines suggest- in an especially vivid way- that 
God interferes in people's motivational systems in a problematic fashion. 
One is hardening of the hearts. The other, for which Judaism has no conve-
nient name, is what Christians call sanctification and, in the context of 
Jewish philosophy, I will call "betterment."2 
In hardening of the hearts God makes a person will a wicked act; in 
''betterment,'' He makes the person will good acts. The showcase example 
of heart-hardening occurs during the Israelites' enslavement in Egypt. In 
three instances- the sixth, eighth and ninth of the ten plagues- we read 
words to the effect that "The Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and [sol 
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he did not let the people [of Israel] go." God also says that when Moses 
will warn the king of the impending death of the Egyptians' firstborn, He 
will cause Pharoah not to listen. During the final plague, Pharoah finally 
relents and releases the Israelites. But shortly after that, his heart is hard-
ened again, and he decides to pursue the Israelites into the sea.3 Likewise, 
the Moabite king Sihon is "hardened" by God to be hostile to Israel in 
order that he be delivered into Israel's hands; later, the same kind of story 
is related about the army of Canaan in the time of Joshua.4 (Proverbs 21:1 
informs us that "the heart of a king is in the Lord's hands like streams of 
water; He will turn it to whatever He wants."S) Without referring to hard-
ening per se, the prophet Elijah insinuates that God has led the hearts of 
the sinning Israelites astray.6 But how can free will and moral responsibili-
ty for hardened acts coexist with determination of one's will by another 
agent? Or are we to say Pharaoh and Sihon, for example, lacked free will 
and incurred no moral responsibility for their hardened acts? 
Similarly with sanctification or betterment: Deuteronomy 30:6 promises 
that God will "circumcise the hearts of you and your descendants." 
Ostensibly what is meant is that God will remove your inclination for evil. 
Again, God tells Ezekiel that He will give the people a "new heart" and 
"new spirit" and will remove their "heart of stone" (Ezek. 36:26). The 
Hebrew prayerbook includes a plea to "compel our evil inclination to be 
subjugated to You." But can sanctified (''bettered'') agents be thought of as 
free and responsible? 
At times, Jewish philosophers, fearing that hardening as ordinarily 
understood is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility, have 
gone to considerable exegetical lengths to deny that the term "hardening 
the heart" has anything to do with intervention in motivational systems. 
The phrase has been interpreted variously to connote, for example, provid-
ing respite or keeping someone alive, thereby preserving the compatibility 
of hardening with freedom and moral responsibility.' But these expedients 
are necessary only if, in addition to embracing the proposition that harden-
ing as ordinarily understood is incompatible with free will and moral 
responsibility, one embraces the thesis of Saadya Gaon (882-942), the father 
of medieval Jewish philosophy, "that the Creator ... does not in any way 
interfere with the actions of men and that He does not exercise any force 
upon them either to obey or disobey Him."B There are Jewish philosophers 
who do not endorse Saadya's no-intervention thesis, and I focus here on 
two of them: Moses Maimonides (1138-1204), the greatest and most author-
itative of Jewish philosophers, and the later Spanish philosopher Joseph 
Albo (ca. 1380-1444).9 
Each of these philosophers generates more than one approach to the 
problem of hardening. In all we will consider six proposals. Two are stimu-
lated by reading Albo: separating them somewhat artificially, in a way he 
does not, I will call them the modest and the bold claims. Two are explicit 
in Maimonides: hardening as punishment by free will deprivation; and 
hardening as punishment by repentance deprivation. Finally, two others, 
while not explicit in Maimonides, grow out of certain general tendencies in 
his thought and are at least loosely related to some of his statements about 
hardening. These are: hardening as God carrying out the agent's real choic-
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es; hardening as irreversible habituation. Of these six, the last differs by 
virtue of its understanding hardening naturalistically- God does not 
directly intervene in the hardened agent's motivational makeup after all, 
though in some sense, as we shall see, the hardening is imputable to Him 
(He is the first cause, or the source of nature's laws, including psychologi-
cal ones). I will locate difficulties in the other five strategies, and the result-
ing conclusion that the sixth is strongest philosophically is of some signifi-
cance. I will try to meet certain textual objections that can be raised to this 
solution, and then will connect the naturalistic approach to hardening to 
the question of how best to understand betterment. Throughout the paper I 
assume that a "solution" to the hardening and betterment problems must 
satisfy two criteria. It must be philosophically cogent; but it also must be 
compatible with, if not directly supported by, the Bible's narrative and ter-
minology. (Albo and Maimonides say much about hardening and little 
about betterment. I will follow them in this emphasis, but at a later stage 
we will pause to see how their claims work vis-a-vis betterment.IO) 
Before proceeding we should be alert to the fact that Alba's strategy and 
Maimonides' first two strategies differ in a profound and fundamental 
way. To put matters roughly, Maimonides, in his "explicit," "exoteric" 
statements, is an "H-incompatibilist." He thinks that, when God hardens 
an agent's heart, that agent does not act freely and does not bear responsi-
bility for his or her hardened acts. Consequently his "exoteric" approaches 
see the hardening as eliminating Pharaoh's free will and responsibility, and 
his analyses labor to explain why God would do such a thing. Albo, on the 
other hand, is a compatibilist about hardening: he thinks that when God 
hardens an agent's heart, that agent acts with freedom and responsibility. 
As a result, Albo views the hardening as restoring, not eliminating, the 
hardened agent's freedom. To be sure, the contrast just set out is somewhat 
deceptive, since Maimonides and Albo do not conceive the process of hard-
ening in the same way; Albo might think (and I believe does think) that 
free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with hardening as 
Maimonides conceives it, while Maimonides might think (though I doubt 
this) that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with hardening 
as Albo conceives it. But for all that the strategies are sharply different. By 
contrast, the final two solutions we will consider in connection with 
Maimonides (the inexplicit, esoteric ones) do not deny the compatibility of 
hardening and responsibility but instead affirm it.11 
1. The problems 
Before looking at Albo and Maimonides, we need to define more pre-
cisely the problems that hardening and betterment pose. "The problem of 
hardening" is usually formulated as a problem of free will deprivation: If 
God causes Pharaoh to will an evil act, namely, keeping the Israelites 
enslaved, has God not deprived a human being of free will? And isn't free 
will a great good? Now this particular problem depends on a judgment 
about the value of free will; for that reason, it emerges most forcefully in 
theological belief systems that explain evil in terms of a free will theodicy, 
in which suffering and wrongdoing are justified by the "greater good" of 
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free will and responsible moral choices.12 It is not clear, however, that 
Jewish philosophers are wedded to a free will theodicy, and in fact, some 
Jewish texts suggest that free will per se is not as great a value as free will 
theodicies imply. For example, authoritative Jewish sources at times justify 
coercion, and this casts doubt on the proposition that the value of free will 
outweighs the disvalue of bad behavior. When the biblical God tries to 
secure obedience to His commands by promising rewards for compliance 
and threatening dire punishments for disobedience, this, too, undermines 
the value of free will, since it is a form of coercion. There are also doctrines 
in Jewish thought to the effect that having free choice is not as good a state 
as doing right automatically.I3 Hence the free will deprivation problem 
rests on a premise about the value of free will that may not hold true in 
Judaism.14 It is one thing to affirm the existence of free will, another to say 
that God never exerts compulsion or influence on motivation. If it is not 
required of God to preserve all human free choices in all situations, the free 
will deprivation problem will barely get off the ground, at least when the 
deprivation serves a purpose. IS H-compatibilism need not be sought, nor 
the expedient of denying that hardening signifies divine intervention. 
But the conundrum of hardening does not disappear so quickly. First of 
all, some philosophers, among them Saadya and Maimonides, and I sus-
pect Albo too, have to address hardening precisely because they value free 
choice highly; regardless of how much value other sources in Judaism 
assign to free will, the problem of free will deprivation emerges fully and 
forcefully for those philosophers. Second, the purpose of hardening has to be 
spelled out even in the absence of a specific problem; there is a difference, 
to which I shall return, between defending God (by saying He didn't do 
anything objectionable by depriving someone of free will) and explaining 
His motivations. Third, disposing of the free will deprivation problem by 
altering our value judgments about free will still leaves us with three other 
difficulties: 
The responsibility problem: If God causes Pharaoh to will an evil act, 
namely, keeping the Israelites enslaved, why should Pharaoh be held 
responsible for this act? 
The repentance-prevention problem: If God wants sinners to repent, as 
Judaism preaches, why would God prevent any individual from 
changing his ways for the better? 
The causation problem: If God causes Pharaoh to will an evil act, name-
ly, keeping the Israelites enslaved, has God not (a) caused an evil act, 
(b) made a person morally worse, and (c) caused further suffering to 
the Israelites and Egyptians? 
All of these problems are formidable even if we are not troubled by God's 
taking away free will. The Jewish philosophers we shall discuss are con-
cerned with responsibility and repentance, not only free will deprivation.16 
Furthermore, repentance, on many accounts, must be a free act. Even 
though, taken in isolation, the free will deprivation problem might be 
solved by demoting the value of free will, to concede that Pharaoh lacks 
free will is also to concede, prima facie, that God deprived him of the pos-
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sibility for repentance. So it is not only the strong statements of Saadya and 
Maimonides affirming free will that create the difficulty about hardening. 
(With regard to betterment, the key problem is of course free will depriva-
tion and moral responsibility; the repentance issue does not apply.) 
2. Albo's two claims: summary 
Although Maimonides lived a few centuries before Albo, I will look first 
at Albo's solution. Here are Albo's words: 
In this way we can explain what is found in Scripture: that the Lord 
strengthens the hearts of evil persons, or makes them stiff-necked, 
and withholds from them the ways of repentance. When adversity 
comes upon the evildoer he becomes pious-looking and returns to 
the Lord from the fear of punishment. As Pharaoh stated, 'The Lord 
is the righteous one; I and my people are the wicked ones" [Exodus 
9:27] .... And because this [his act] is like one that is compelled 
rather than free, the Lord strengthens His heart. .. and therefore he 
says that this adversity came by accident and not because of divine 
providence. This is done in order to remove from his heart the soft-
ness it acquired because of the adversity, so that the person will 
remain in his natural state and his state of choice without anything 
compelling him, and then it may be determined whether his repen-
tance was an instance of free choice .... The Lord leaves [the evildo-
er] to his free choice without any external compulsion, and he choos-
es a path for himself.'? 
We may distinguish two claims in Albo's text, which he melds into one 
unified strategy.'" The first claim is that had God not hardened Pharaoh's 
heart, and Pharaoh would have therefore released the Israelites due to the 
mounting pressure of the plagues, this would not have been a free choice 
on Pharaoh's part anyway and would not have constituted repentance; 
rather, the decision to release would then have been coerced. According to 
this claim taken by itself (i.e., without the rest of what Albo says), 
Pharaoh's actual act of keeping the Israelites enslaved (the "hardened" act) 
may be unfree due to its being caused by God's intervention, but the 
charge that God has "deprived" Pharaoh of free will is false, since Pharaoh 
is not less free than if God had not intervened. Also, Pharaoh would not 
have genuinely repented had he succumbed to the plagues' pressure. 
We may call this the "modest" claim. The modest claim is content to 
affirm a parity between the status of Pharaoh's "hardened" act and the sta-
tus of the act he would have performed had his heart not been hardened. 
The modest claim does not try to show, however, that the hardened act is 
free. The modest claim therefore is not a form of H-compatibilism, but 
rather can go along with an incompatibilist view of hardening. 
However, Albo's second claim takes precisely this step: to claim that, 
despite its being produced by God's intervention, Pharaoh's act of keeping 
the Israelites enslaved is free. The key here is Albo's depiction of the 
"mechanics" of hardening. Albo believes that when God "hardens" 
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Pharaoh's heart, this means merely that he strengthens Pharaoh's heart, giv-
ing him the fortitude not to let the plagues automatically dictate a decision 
to release the Israelites. Pharaoh, in Albo's story, is- thanks to the harden-
ing - left with a choice: whether to release the Israelites or to keep them 
enslaved. It is the existence of this choice that makes his act of keeping 
them enslaved a free act; he has open to him a genuine alternative, namely, 
to release them. And it is this same choice that means he has a possibility to 
repent. His ultimate failure to release the Israelites is free, then, because 
Pharaoh chooses between two alternatives and neither alternative is 
coerced. Albo is not a strong H-compatibilist: hardening in the straightfor-
ward sense of God imposing a motivational structure is not compatible 
with freedom. But Albo is an H-compatibilist in the sense that hardening as 
he explains it - the unsolicited removal by another agent of certain psycho-
logical impediments like fears and internal pressures, resulting in bad 
acts- is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. I shall refer to 
the claim that the hardened act is free and responsible as the "bold" claim.19 
It might seem as if trying to combine the modest and bold claims gives 
the theist unnnecessary work. Aren't the problems solved by using either 
claim? Is it really necessary to establish both? The answer is somewhat 
complicated. Suppose we paraphrase the modest claim as: 
(M) If God had not hardened Pharaoh's heart, and Pharaoh would 
have released the Israelites because of the pressure of the plagues, 
Pharaoh's release of them would have been unfree. 
Next let us paraphrase the bold claim as: 
(B) By hardening Pharaoh's heart, God brought about a situation in 
which Pharaoh freely chose to keep the Israelites enslaved and had a 
chance to repent. 
Now suppose a theist were to adopt (M) without (B). A critic might then 
respond to the theist, "but by hardening Pharaoh's heart, God brought it 
about that he acted unfreely anyway. So (M) does not explain why God 
hardened Pharaoh's heart. It shows only that the hardening did not 
'deprive' the king of freedom (he would have acted unfreely had he 
released them). And it did not 'deprive' him of the possibility of repenting, 
since his 'repentance' would not have been real repentance anyway. (M) is 
a defense of God against the charge that he has taken away someone's free 
will; it is not an explanation of His ways." Once we supplement (M) with 
(B), however, a reply to this concern is at hand: we may explain that God 
hardened Pharaoh's heart in order to ensure that Pharaoh acted freely and 
had a chance to repent. Adding (B) to (M), in other words, provides an 
explanation and not merely a defense. 
Similarly, suppose someone were to adopt (B) without (M). A critic might 
then respond to such a theist, ''but hardening Pharaoh's heart was not need-
ed in order to bring it about that Pharaoh acted freely and had a chance to 
repent. Had God not hardened Pharaoh's heart, and he would have released 
the Israelites, this too would have been a free act and would have constituted 
484 Faith and Philosophy 
repentance. So (B) does not explain why God hardened Pharaoh's heart. It 
shows only that the hardening did not make the king act unfreely and 
deprive him of a chance to repent." Once we supplement (B) with (M), we 
may explain that God hardened Pharaoh's heart in order to ensure that 
Pharaoh acted freely and had a chance to repent, thus answering the critic.2n 
Once a theist adopts both (B) and (M), then, he may claim that God hard-
ened Pharaoh's heart precisely in order to ensure Pharaoh's free will 
and/ or the possibility of repentance. So, conjoining (M) with (B) may be 
necessary if the theist wants an explanation of hardening and not merely a 
defense. And yet, it still may be unnecessary work on the theist's part, for 
there are other possible reasons for God's hardening of Pharaoh's heart. 
Several times, the Bible implies that God hardened Pharaoh's heart 
because by continuing the plagues God enhanced His power in the eyes of 
Egyptians and Israelites alike, leading them to flknowledge" of Him. To 
instill that knowledge, it was necessary for him to manifest His power over 
sea, earth, and heaven fully, and that required that the plagues run their 
full course.21 If that explanation is correct, then the theist does not need both 
(M) and (B) to construct an explanation of the hardening. On the other 
hand, it should be noted that some interpreters think that God meant to 
enhance his glory by Pharaoh's eventually repenting.22 Hence whether (M) 
and (B) are both necessary depends on how one understands the motive 
behind the hardening. 
In sum, a theist needs only one of the two claims- modest or bold- to 
construct a defense; but he will have an explanation only if he either (a) estab-
lishes both the modest and the bold claim, or (b) if he accepts the flgreater 
manifestation of power" account of why God hardened the heart. 
Unfortunately, both the modest and the bold claims, as we have explained 
them, are open to challenge. 
3. Albo's modest claim: coercion and free will 
Consider first the modest claim. The modest claim supposes that an act 
performed in the presence of coercive incentives is not free. Consider, how-
ever, the condition that traditional compatibilists (not H-compatibilists) 
impose on free will: an agent does as he wants and because he wants it; 
also, he would do otherwise if he wanted to do otherwise. Now a coerced 
agent does as he wants and because he wants it; also, he would do other-
wise if he wanted to do otherwise. On a simple compatibilist analysis, 
therefore, a coerced act is free, and had Pharaoh released the Israelites, this 
would have counted as a free act- contrary to Alba. 
To be sure, Alba need not accept the compatibiIist's analysis. He might 
even join with those who object to compatibilism precisely because it 
ostensibly carries the consequence that coerced acts are free. But Bernard 
Williams raises the following more general argument for treating coerced 
acts as free: 
If we are not to count as exercising freewill in cases of this kind [cases 
of coercion], then we never exercise it, since all choices operate in a 
space of alternatives constrained by the cost of various possibilities.23 
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If a road you wish to take is blocked by some nonhuman danger (e.g., 
steadily falling rocks), and you therefore choose another road, we regard 
your choice as free. If a road you wish to take is blocked not by a rockslide 
but by a gunman who threatens to shoot you if you pass through, and as a 
result you must take another road, why should we treat this any different-
ly?24 So wonder Williams and others: after all, in both cases, the option of 
taking the other road exists, it is just too costly- it has been rendered 
"ineligible."2s Williams' argument challenges Alba to differentiate cases of 
coercion, which he regards as unfree, from other cases in which only one 
option is reasonable for an agent yet the agent acts freely.>6 Until that is 
done, plainly the modest claim is not completely successfulY 
Even supposing that coerced acts are unfree, however, we may differen-
tiate between coercion, in which a person has only one "eligible alternative" 
and nothing else is an "eligible alternative" for him, and duress, in which a 
person has two eligible alternatives but feels pressured by other agents into 
accepting one of them. Since a person has eligible alternative possibilities 
when acting under duress, arguably an act done out of duress is a free act 
even if a coerced act is not. Now according to the modest claim, had 
Pharaoh released the Israelites because of the plagues, this would have 
been an unfree act because it would have been coerced. But can it not be 
regarded as an act performed under duress, in the special sense of duress 
that I outlined? Recall that Pharaoh had showed great strength of will in 
not releasing the Israelites during the first five plagues, and also that in 
some of the later plagues, he hardens his own heart, without divine assis-
tance.28 It is hard to believe that, even though he defies intimidation on his 
own on both earlier and later occasions, Pharaoh could not have chosen to 
keep the Israelites enslaved after the sixth, eighth, and ninth plagues. 
Rather, at most we can say that he merely would not have so chosen if not 
for the hardening.29 If Pharaoh had eligible alternative possibilities, as I am 
suggesting, then releasing the Israelites due to the plagues would have 
been not a coerced act but an act under duress, and Albo should regard it 
as free. It would have come at a cost that Pharaoh would be willing to pay, 
and thinks he ought to pay, to avert further devastation, even though he 
also recognizes reasons for keeping the Israelites as slaves.3o 
4. Albo's modest claim (continued): levels of repentance 
Alba claims that had Pharaoh released the Israelites under pressure of 
the plagues, this would not have qualified as an act of repentance. But the 
Talmud distinguishes between repentance out of fear (teshuvah mi-ljir'ah) 
and repentance out of love (teshuvah me-ahavah).31 Interpreters differ over 
details of this distinction, but there is general agreement that repentance 
out of fear is repentance due to fear of punishment, while repentance out 
of love is motivated by something higher, for example, a recognition of the 
inherent wrongness of one's past deeds and a commitment to living rightly 
in the future for the right reason: love of God. Repentance out of fear is a 
level of repentance, albeit a low one. Had Pharaoh chosen to release the 
Israelites due to pressure of the plagues, this would have constituted a 
form of repentance. Alba therefore cannot claim that Pharaoh would not be 
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repenting at all were he to release the Israelites due to pressure of the 
plagues, but only that he would not be repenting out of love. It is hard to see 
why God must go so far as to make repentance out of love possible for 
Pharaoh. Albo thus seems to place excessively strict constraints on repen-
tance, ignoring the fear\ love distinction. In fact, insofar as it is natural to 
assume that an act of repentance is free, the fact that the release under pres-
sure would have constituted an act of repentance validates the earlier 
charge that the release under pressure would have been free rather than 
unfree. 
Fortunately, Albo himself raises the question of why Pharaoh could not 
attain the level of repentance from fear by releasing the Israelites due to 
pressure of the plagues. He argues, by way of response, that there is a dis-
tinction between "repentance out of fear" and the situation in which 
Pharaoh found himself, a situation he characterizes as "ones" (coercion or 
duress). As Albo describes repentance from fear, "even in a time of respite, 
the fear of God is before him, and he has fear and trepidation due to anxi-
ety over his tribulations because he believes that these all come from God 
as retribution and punishment [as opposed to chance]." "Repentance out 
of fear" is repentance due to an abiding, stable fear of punishment, based on 
a continuing recognition of God's power. So, for example, if Pharaoh were 
to release the Israelites out of a fear that he will be punished for his past 
misdeeds, and that fear were to remain with him and affect later actions, 
he would have achieved the level of "repentance out of fear." But that is 
not the situation in the Bible's narrative. In the Bible, Pharaoh is already, 
right now, being subjected to adversities. If he were to release the Israelites 
due to the pressure of the plagues, he would be like "a slave who pleads 
before his master while the master is beating him; when the master with-
draws the rod of his anger, he will disobey as before." When Pharaoh 
would see a break in the plagues, he would harden his heart on his own 
and exit his fear-state. The person in a state of ones is responding to a pun-
ishment but not to the one who punishes.32 Albo regards the two types of 
putative "fear-repentance" as crucially different: relenting is not the same 
as repenting. 
The distinction between these two kinds of fear-states and between their 
respective statuses as repentance clearly is indispensable to Albo's solution. 
But is the distinction convincing? It will not do to draw the distinction entire-
ly in terms of whether the adversity is occurring at the moment of the act or 
is simply an anticipated adversity. It seems strange to deny that repentance 
that occurs while a person is suffering - a kind of foxhole repentance- can 
constitute repentance of some level. Talmudic discussions, furthermore, 
which Albo, as a tradition-bound Jewish philosopher, must respect, suggest 
that there are such cases.33 What, then, is the basis for Albo's distinction? 
From Albo's discussion we may tease out three criteria for an act's attaining 
the level of repentance out of fear: (1) S satisfies a certain counterfactual con-
dition; (2) S's act manifests some degree of freedom; (3) S acknowledges the 
power of God. Each of his suggestions meets with a difficulty. 
Let's look first at the counterfactual condition, Albo's main criterion. 
Speaking of the slave who is being beaten by his master, Albo writes: 
"when the master removes the rod of his anger, he [the slave] will disobey 
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as before." But what this says is that when the duress- or coercion-inducing 
factor that is causing him to behave rightly is removed, he will not behave 
rightly. Isn't that true, though, even of Alba's other category, the person 
who truly repents "out of fear"? It is true that the latter seems to be in an 
enduring state, unlike the slave who is being beaten. Still, the duress-
inducing, or partly coercive, factor that is causing him to behave well, is 
the belief that God would punish him if he sins. Remove that factor, and 
the person ex hypothesi (and tautologically) will behave badly again. Yet 
this stance qualifies as repentance out of fear. 
Alba would counter that the slave lacks fear when he is not being beat-
en, and so this is not a case of repentance out of abiding fear. It is repen-
tance out of an episodic fear. For the critic this is enough to constitute repen-
tance; a rep enter can backslide when the incentive is removed. For Alba, 
repentance out of fear must be repentance out of true fear. The repenter out 
of fear must be in a certain abiding cognitive and affective state. I think 
Alba and his critic are destined to part company on this one. But Alba 
needs to address some potential troubles. The Talmud refers to a type of 
repentance that occurs in response to afflictions (yissurin)- albeit it treats 
this as a separate category from fear-repentance. The Talmud also refers to 
people repenting right before death.}.! As well, the critic can adduce cases in 
which people repent because of pangs of conscience or feelings of revul-
sion, but not fear of God. Alba would have to discredit these as falling 
short of repentance out of fear; but it's counterintuitive not to think of these 
as a level of repentance. Some sources in Jewish tradition suggest that a 
person is regarded as a penitent if, when placed in circumstances similar to 
those in which he previously sinned, he this time does the right thing- for 
any reason, even powerlessness. This may sound much too lenient, but 
there is precedent for this perspective in Jewish law.35 
Alba's counterfactual criterion for separating Pharaoh's case from 
repentance out of fear thus generates large issues about what kinds of 
repentance qualify as fear-repentance. Since the resolution of these issues is 
too big to undertake here, we should in the interests of fairness look at his 
other two ways of differentiating Pharaoh's case from repentance out of 
fear. Neither of the other criteria is successful, I think. Consider criterion 
(2): that the case he labels "repentance out of fear" involves an element of 
freedom that would not be exemplified by Pharaoh were Pharaoh to 
release the Israelites due to pressure from the plagues. How shall we draw 
the desired distinction? The most natural avenue is to view the repenter-
out-of-fear as simply being "unable to take it any more," cracking under 
strain and fatigue.'" But one could just as well say that a person who is 
threatened with evils gives in to fear, that he caves in to a threat and "can't 
take" the threat any more. That is what happens in cases of coercion, which 
we said Alba treats as cases of unfree action. Also, as has often been noted 
in the literature on coercion, there is a clear sense in which a coerced 
agent- even one undergoing an adversity- is making a free, rational 
decision by giving in, the decision not to endure certain evils.37 From the 
point of view of freedom, it isn't clear that we have a distinction between 
responding to anticipated evils and responding to occurrent ones. 
Alba's third suggestion does not fare well either. Surely Pharaoh knows 
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that God is the source of the ills that are befalling him and his people. 
We have, then, two criteria that do not permit Albo to exclude Pharaoh's 
would-be repentance from the category of acceptable repentance, and one 
that does exclude Pharoah's repentance yet is best described as respectable 
but highly debatable (the counterfactual condition). Even with a decent cri-
terion in hand, however, Albo's strategy of linking hardening to the notion 
that, were Pharaoh to release the Israelites, his repentance would not be 
even at the level of fear-repentance, turns out to be problematic. Note that 
after the tenth plague, God does not harden Pharaoh's heart, and Pharaoh 
releases the Israelites. Since God does not harden his heart at this point, 
Albo must think that Pharaoh has repented. He must regard Pharaoh's 
pious-sounding declaration in Exodus 9:27 and 10:16-17, which Albo cites, 
that "God is the righteous one, but I and my people are the wicked ones" as 
a sincere proclamation, reflecting some type of repentance- either repen-
tance out of love or repentance out of fear. Otherwise why would God, on 
Albo's principles, allow the Israelites' release?38 But no sooner has he 
released the Israelites than Pharaoh goes back to pursue them. And the pur-
suit is said by the Bible to be a result of hardening. So Albo has a problem. 
Pharaoh repented during plague ten, we said. Further, were Pharaoh to 
refrain from pursuit, as he would have done but for the hardening, it would 
be because of fear of future reprisal, and should qualify as repentance out of 
fear. Why, then, the later hardening?'9 
It would be foolish of me to strive for knockdown arguments on each 
point I have made. But overall, it is difficult to defend the thesis that were 
Pharaoh to release the Israelites during the sixth plague this would not 
constitute any level of repentance. As long as fear-repentance has some sta-
tus, it is not clear why God's hardening does not constitute a prevention of 
repentance. The modest claim is not convincing. 
5. Alba's bold claim 
We come now to the bold claim, which seeks to show that by strength-
ening Pharaoh's ability to resist giving in to the adversities around him, 
God gives Pharaoh a genuine choice whether to keep the Israelites 
enslaved or instead release them because of the plagues, a "more real" 
choice than he would have without the hardening. With the creation of real 
options comes the chance for real repentance. This doesn't necessarily mean 
that the hardening creates the opportunity for him to repent out of love; 
maybe the most he is capable of is repentance out of fear. But, even granti-
ng this quite unmotivated assertion, Albo can regard fear-repentance as 
repentance enough.40 
When God gives Pharaoh "choice," what does that mean? On the read-
ing of Albo's intent that I favor, God restores to Pharaoh "eligible alterna-
tive possibilities." He strengthens Pharaoh's resolve to keep the Israelites 
enslaved; He does not make that resolve so strong that Pharaoh is totally 
unmoved by the plagues. When God removes fear from Pharaoh's heart, 
he has levelled the playing field: the chances of releasing the Israelites and 
keeping them enslaved (because he discounts the plagues as chance occur-
rences) are equal.4l 
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But there is a deep concern about Albo's bold claim. When he claims 
that God restores Pharaoh's free choice, Albo disregards the history of how 
Pharaoh came to make that choice. Pharaoh acts as a result of God's exter-
nally manipulating his desire to keep the Israelites enslaved (by strength-
ening that desire and/ or weakening competing ones). The king thus 
resembles a person who does act A because a hypnotist implants in him a 
desire to do A. An act performed as a result of hypnotic suggestion is wide-
ly regarded as an unfree act. Now the analogy to the hypnotized act is not 
exact- God is not making the desire irresistible for Pharaoh according to 
Albo. Also, God does not implant the desire in Pharaoh's case but only 
strengthens it and/or weakens opposing desires. But suppose that some-
one implants a less-than-irresistible suggestion in 5 to do A, and S does A. 
We might call S's act unfree even though he could have done otherwise. 
And in a case where a hypnotist only strengthens or weakens certain 
desires, but does not implant any, some philosophers would regard the 
resultant act as unfree and as reflecting diminished responsibility (assum-
ing the subject is not aware that she is hypnotized).42 Intuitions are not clear 
here, but someone brought up on charges for crimes committed under an 
influence that is analogous to God's interference with Pharaoh would cer-
tainly have a reasonable grounds for acquitta1:3 The hypnotist analogy is 
therefore at least prima facie troubling, and Maimonides and Saadya would 
probably both accept it as a counterexample to Albo.44 Though free choice 
may require alternative possibilities, merely having alternative possibili-
ties, on this view, is not sufficient for free choice. 
For the sake of both charity and completeness, we might consider a 
modification of Albo's account (not put forth by him) that presents a differ-
ent analysis of why God can be said to have "restored" Pharoah's choice. 
By increasing the king's willpower (by weakening certain desires and/ or 
strengthening others), God, de facto, is- given Pharaoh's already formed 
character- ensuring that he keeps the Israelites enslaved. That is, once he 
is hardened to the plagues, Pharaoh reverts to his previously formed per-
sonality. He has the opportunity to act in accordance with his true self. If it 
is countered that a decision to release the Israelites due to the plagues 
would be a decision in character too, since Pharaoh has a character that 
makes him cave in to extreme incentives at this precise level of pressure, 
the reply would be that releasing the Israelites would be an akratic act on 
Pharaoh's part, an act contrary to better judgment, and therefore inconsis-
tent with his character. His character is expressed by actions in accord with 
best judgment. Only the decision to keep the Israelites enslaved is in char-
acter; the decision to release them is pure weakness. Furthermore, since the 
decision is in character, the objection based on the fact it is externally 
induced, as in hypnosis, loses its force. 
But explaining God's "restoration" of Pharaoh's choice in this way is not 
helpful. The account does not explain how the hardening gives Pharaoh an 
opportunity to repent; at best it explains how the hardening gives him an 
opportunity to act freely. (Albo, recall, was exercised over the repentance 
problem.) And even if our interest is in restoring free will rather than 
restoring repentance, I have trouble with the premise that akratic acts are 
acts out of character. Suppose a politician gives in to temptation at consid-
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erable cost to what he most values. This is akratic behavior. No one, not 
even the offender, thinks that giving in to appetite is worth the trouble it 
will cause. But isn't it precisely here that we raise the "character" issue? 
Isn't the politician free and responsible? One might retort that if the politi-
cian resists temptation on almost all occasions but gives in once, his act is 
out of character and not free. But why should anyone think that? And isn't 
the politician responsible for his act? Furthermore, is the example of the 
politician who succumbs once really parallel to Pharaoh's case? For one 
thing, in Pharaoh's case the plagues may have had a cumulative impact. 
The king's character may be such that given this particular accumulated 
temptation to release the Israelites, he would. Moreover, God has to hard-
en Pharaoh's heart repeatedly. This suggests that Pharaoh would be of such 
a character as to succumb to the plagues, but for the hardening. 
To sum up, Alba's modest claim depends on contestable assumptions 
about freedom and about the miminum level needed for repentance. His 
bold claim requires some controversial intuitions about the hypnotist 
example- intuitions that Maimonides and Saadya would think are wrong. 
The suggestion that these reflections encourage is that, pace Albo, Pharaoh 
should not be responsible, or should not be fully responsible, for his hard-
ened acts. 
Although I am focusing on hardening, we should pause to ask what the 
bearing of our discussion is on betterment. (The question will become 
important later.) If we define the problem with hardening as the withhold-
ing of repentance, then betterment poses no problem at all; or, if anything, 
the problem is why God doesn't better more often. But if we define the 
problem of hardening in terms of free will deprivation, then insofar as God 
intervenes in both hardening and betterment, the free will deprivation 
problem applies to both types of intervention. The free will deprivation 
problem can be answered, as I indicated, by denying that free will is so 
valuable, but even short of that, I would suggest that Albo's bold claim 
works reasonably well for betterment. In typical cases of betterment, the 
agent will ask to be bettered and to have motivational obstacles to doing 
the good removed. I suggest that a person who asks to be hypnotized into 
doing certain types of actions, and is then in fact hypnotized into doing 
them, is responsible for those actions. An agent bettered by God strength-
ening or weakening certain desires upon the agent's request is free and 
responsible.4s So the hypnosis objection will not apply to betterment. 
6. Maimonides (0: eliminating free will 
Returning now to hardening, what if we just accept the hypnotist analo-
gy, see the hardening for the manipulation that it is, deny that the hard-
ened act is free, and give up the idea that Pharaoh was held responsible for 
his hardened acts and that he acted freely?16 That is precisely Maimonides' 
move. I would justify the move as follows. True, God punishes Pharaoh 
and his people. But their eventual fate - their firstborn sons die and, later, 
their warriors drown at sea- suggests that it is the original crime of 
drowning or trying to drown male Hebrew children that meets with retri-
bution,17 and not necessarily any obstinacy shown by them or their king in 
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the face of the plagues. Even if we assume, plausibly, that God held 
Pharaoh culpable for his resistance to the earlier plagues, there is no evi-
dence that He held Pharaoh responsible for his later, hardened acts in par-
ticular. As a result, it is defensible to hold that - in the Bible's view-
Pharaoh, as a hardened agent, did not will freely and was not held respon-
sible. If that is right- and some biblical scholars have thought S048_ then 
the responsibility problem is a non-starter. 
Maimonides in some places states the proposition I have just sought to 
motivate, that Pharaoh was not held responsible for his hardened acts. We 
still need, however, to grasp God's motive for the hardening and the depri-
vation of free will. In his monumental legal code, the Mislmeh Torah, in the 
section titled, Laws of Repentance (Hilkhat Teshuvah),49 Maimonides fills in 
this motive. He asserts that God hardens the agent's heart as a means of 
punishing him. The agent is deprived of two great goods- (a) free will, 
along with (b) the potential to act rightly- and this is an evil for the hard-
ened agent, quite apart from the augmentation of plagues. Removing free 
will is a perfectly just punishment for a person so depraved, an appropri-
ate tit-for-tat. The agent hardened his own heart in the earlier plagues, con-
trary to God's will, so now his heart becomes hardened by God, contrary 
to his own will. Further, he chose to do evil, so now his punishment (or 
part of it) is that he does evil. As Norman Kretzmann acutely puts it in 
describing a related claim made by Aquinas, hardening is not only a case 
of the punishment fitting the crime- rather, hardening is U a punishment 
that is the very sin that it punishes."so 
This account gives rise to an interesting thought: that, paradoxically, 
theists who wish to preserve the value of free will do just fine if they 
deny that hardened agents will freely. The punishment interpretation 
presupposes a high assessment of free will; precisely because free will is a 
good, as is the capacity to do the right thing, being deprived of these 
counts as a punishment. Insofar as it recognizes the value of free will, the 
"punishment" solution is compatible with, indeed dovetails with, free-
will theodicies.s1 
Unfortunately, Maimonides' solution, as stated thus far, is incomplete. 
First of all, it goes no distance toward explaining God's making an agent 
better, and in fact can be challenged by the implications that it carries for 
betterment. Maimonides obviously cannot say that an agent who is bet-
tered is being punished for previous wrong choices! Even if the present 
choice of a right act is a welcome reward for earlier good choices, being 
deprived of free will is an evil. So for betterment to be explained the notion 
that deprivation of free 'will is a punishment has to give way to the notion 
that being deprived of correct choices is a punishment. Second, it is obvious 
that Maimonides' account has not yet touched the repentance problem. To 
see why God would deprive Pharaoh of repentance, we need to extend 
Maimonides' account. 
7. Maimanides (ii): preventing repentance 
Maimonides' approach to the repentance problem is rooted in the Sages' 
solution as expressed in the midrash: 
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'And the Lord strengthened Pharaoh's heart': Since the Holy One, 
Blessed Be He, saw that [Pharaoh] did not change his mind due to the 
first five plagues, from then on the Holy One, Blessed Be He, said: 
even if he wants to repent, I will strengthen his heart in order to exact 
all that is due from him.52 
Another midrashic statement articulates the general principle underlying 
Pharaoh's case: 
Rabbi Phineas the priest, son of Rabbi Hama, said: ... After the Holy 
One, Blessed Be He, waits for evildoers to repent and they do not, 
then even if they want to repent later, He takes over their heart so 
that they not repent.53 
The midrash does not itself specifically deny that Pharaoh was held 
responsible and was punished for his hardened acts, but Maimonides 
along with other medieval exegetes and philosophers do.54 In a work called 
Eight Chapters/5 Maimonides first states that, if Pharaoh and the Egyptians 
"had committed no other sin than not letting Israel go free" (due to hard-
ening), then it would have been "an injustice" for God to punish them. (As 
noted earlier, Maimonides asserts that any kind of influence by another 
agent, other than rational instruction, takes away free wilUh) But in actuali-
ty Pharaoh and the Egyptians had earlier oppressed the Israelites- repeat-
edly. And "this [earlier] action was due to their choice and to the evil char-
acter of their thought; there was nothing compelling them to do it." Those 
acts therefore merited punishment. But "it was not possible to punish them 
if they repented, so they were prevented from repenting and they contin-
ued holding [lsrael]."57 Whereas in Laws of Repentance it appeared that the 
agent's loss of free will constitutes the punishment, in Eight Chapters it is the 
agent's undergoing plagues (or as in Sihon's case military defeat) that con-
stitutes the punishmenU8 
So: God did not punish the Egyptians for not repenting, since on 
Maimonides' premises (of H-incompatibilism), God cannot punish a per-
son for an act that God brought about. But God can prevent a person from 
repenting as a means of exacting punishment for acts previously per-
formed.''! 
The differences between Maimonides' account and that of Albo are dra-
matic. (i) Albo sees God as trying to preserve Pharaoh's chances of free will 
and repentance; Maimonides sees God as trying to eliminate Pharaoh's free 
will and chances of repenting, on the grounds that Pharaoh does not 
deserve a chance to repent. (ll) Albo thinks Pharaoh is responsible for his 
later choices. Maimonides denies this. (iii) Albo does not think that the his-
tory of Pharaoh's choice to keep the Israelites enslaved- its origin in hard-
ening- undermines Pharaoh's freedom and responsibility. Maimonides 
does; though his conception of hardening seems to be far more invasive 
than Albo's, he probably would think that even in Albo's scenario there is 
too much intervention to allow for free will.60 
There are a few difficulties in the Maimonidean approach enunciated in 
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Eight Chapters. First,61 the entire point of repentance would seem to be to 
that if a person repents, that person's punishment must be remitted. If the 
problem in Pharaoh's case is that God would have to withhold a just pun-
ishment, isn't that an objection to the whole notion that repentance averts 
punishment, that, in the words of the High Holiday liturgy, "repentance 
and prayer and charity avert the evil decree"? It is true that Pharaoh's 
crimes are unusually heinous. But other unusually heinous sinners in the 
Bible are not punished when they repent. Surely when God forgave the 
city of Nineveh, and chastised Jonah for not understanding how He could 
do this, God was saying that even perpetrators of heinous sins are entitled 
to forgiveness. 62 If we follow Maimonides' reasoning, we would expect 
there to be a sliding scale by which the greater the evildoing, the more God 
would act to prevent repentance and the less chance there would be of God 
allowing repentance. But this would undercut verses that state, "Do I 
desire the death of the wicked, says the Lord? Is it not rather his return 
from his evil ways, so he will live?" (Ezekiel 18:23), and "I do not desire the 
death of he who dies, says the Lord God. Repent and live!" (Ibid. 18:32). 
Forgiving penitents is an act of divine mercy, not divine justice. Whatever 
philosophical problems plague the notion of remitting punishment,63 a sys-
tem that accepts repentance is anyway committed to declaring those prob-
lems soluble. Once that stance is taken, it is hard to accept that God will 
take steps to prevent repentance by certain individuals on the grounds that 
they don't deserve it. To quote Voltaire's alleged quip to his priest on his 
deathbed, when the priest assured Voltaire that all his sins would be for-
given, "Bien sur qu'il me pardonera, c'est son metier" (of course He'll for-
give me- that's his job).64 
But even if it is granted that, due to the gravity of Pharaoh's sins, God 
should punish Pharoah for those sins fully and should not remit the pun-
ishment on account of Pharaoh's repentance, we can formulate a second 
objection to Maimonides. If it's really so unjust for Pharaoh's punishment 
to be remitted,let it not be remitted. But does it follow from the need to 
punish Pharaoh that God should not allow Pharaoh the opportunity to 
repent? Isn't there value in repentance even if the penitent does not have 
his punishment remitted? Isn't there value in allowing his self-transforma-
tion? If it's unjust for Pharoah to be forgiven, let God punish him for his 
earlier wrongs, but let Pharaoh at least improve himself while the axe falls. 
Let there be repentance without mitigation. 
How cogent are these objections? As regards the first question, which 
boils down to "how is Pharaoh different from other sinners?," to some 
extent the critic's modus tollens is Maimonides' modus pOllens: great evil-
doers, in his view, do stand less chance of repenting than others, because 
they stand less chance of God allowing them to repent. But there is 
another reply. We should remember that, according to the biblical text, 
God hardened Pharaoh's heart in order to display the divine power and 
"multiply my wonders in the Land of Egypt" (Exodus 12:9). The Bible 
implies several times that God hardened Pharaoh's heart because by 
continuing the plagues God enhanced His glory. It was necessary for 
him to manifest His power fully. This point encourages a modified pun-
ishment strategy. It may be that God does not harden the hearts of all 
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evildoers, because sometimes the harmful consequences for others will 
outweigh the "good" of punishment. But when God has another motive 
to harden- say, to multiply His wonders, or to deliver an enemy to 
Israel (as in Sihon's case)- then He will do so, but only provided that 
the hardened agent deserves the hardening. To put it another way, the 
agent's past wickedness is a reason for God's allowing Himself to harden 
once the hardening is necessary for other reasons; it is not itself a reason to 
harden. This isn't the plain sense of Maimonides' words, but it accounts 
for what otherwise seems to be an arbitrary exception being made of 
Pharaoh. The explanation requires withdrawing Maimonides' account of 
the later plagues as punishment for Pharaoh, and replacing it with an 
account of the plagues as needed to enhance God's greatness. That 
Pharaoh deserves punishment should be utilized as a reply to an objec-
tion to hardening for the sake of God's glory, not as a reason for the 
hardening. 
Turning to the second question, of why God doesn't punish even 
while accepting repentance, I suspect that the answer has to do with the 
fact that Pharaoh's "repentance," which is being prevented, would be of 
a low level: it is due to immediate pressure. Maimonides (contrary to 
Albo) may hold that this is a level of repentance, and furthermore that it 
is a level of repentance such that a person who attains that level must 
have his punishment withdrawn. Now you will ask, why should the fact 
the repentance is on a low level mean that the punishment must be with-
drawn? Shouldn't it be the other way around, that a low level repen-
tance has less chance of making punishment be withdrawn? 
This question can be answered by noting that Maimonides thinks, in 
general, that being motivated by anticipations of reward and punish-
ment reflects a low level of religious understanding. In the last chapter 
of the section of his Mishneh Torah legal code called Laws of Repentance 
(and elsewhere), he posits an ideal of "worship of God out of love," in 
which one's worship is not motivated by any concern other than the 
intrinsic rightness or wrongness of what one is doing. The entire content 
of repentance out of fear is exhausted by expiation, by the withdrawing 
of punishment. A person on a higher level will not be concerned with 
punishment. So, paradoxically, a person on lower level of repentance 
must have his sins forgiven and punishment withheld, because expia-
tion is the only purpose that lower level repentance could serve for him 
when there is no deep change in the person's orientation toward God. hs 
Even accepting this somewhat forced answer to the second objection, 
a third objection arises. Maimonides makes it seem as if God cannot 
inflict a just punishment on Pharaoh if he repents. But could He not just 
reduce the punishment in the light of repentance? If so, it could turn out 
that the result even of mitigating the sentence is a punishment as harsh 
in its effect as a nonmitigated sentence. Imagine someone sentenced to 
three hundred years in prison for multiple crimes whose sentence is 
reduced to 200 years for good behavior! Mitigating Pharaoh's punish-
ment might still result in him being drowned at sea. And such mitiga-
tion is consistent with the demands of lower level repentance.66 
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8. God and responsibility for one's character 
The "Maimonidean" solutions we have explored to this point surface 
explicitly in Maimonides' treatment of hardening; that is, he openly relates 
hardening to the inappropriateness of God remitting Pharaoh's punish-
ment. The next two solutions that I will assess- the final two we will con-
sider- are not explicitly formulated by him, but instead are variations on 
themes that are found in Maimonides' writings. These solutions, I concede, 
do not sit easily with the explicit Maimonidean treatments of hardening in 
terms of remitting punishment, but it is a commonplace among inter-
preters of Maimonides that his explicit, "exoteric" statements are not 
always a reliable guide to his "esoteric" meaning and deepest intent,67 Also, 
the solutions to follow are at least loosely connected to Maimonidean 
teachings, and can be ascribed to him by what philosophers call the 
Principle of (Interpretive) Charity. It is beside my main point to argue that 
Maimonides actually intends these solutions, but I do believe he may, and 
they must be considered regardless. 
The basic perspective of these final two solutions derives from the Bible 
and Talmud. In Psalms 81:11-12, we read: "But my people would not listen 
to me; Israel would not submit to me. So I gave them over to their stubborn 
hearts to follow their own devices." What is being asserted here is that God 
allows people to follow their own choices, without divine interference, 
even when their choices are wrong. The Talmud goes further when it 
teaches: "In the way a person wants to go, we take him" (Makkot lOb). And 
on Sabbath 104a, Rabbi Simon ben Lakish (known as Resh Lakish) states 
that "when one comes to be declared impure, we give him an opening [to 
impurity]; when one comes to be purified, we assist him./68 Extended to 
God's hardening of Pharaoh's heart, these ideas suggest that hardening is 
God's way of respecting Pharaoh's own choices, of allowing him to follow 
in his chosen path while imposing upon him (contrary to the earlier sug-
gestions) full responsibility for those hardened acts. The purpose is not to 
give people their previously incurred just deserts- as in Eight Chapters-
but to preserve the human being's control over his or her own destiny. 
We considered a similar bold response in connection with Albo, and the 
problem I would pose for the present version of the "responsibility for 
choice" reply is similar to the difficulty we raised in that earlier context. 
Without God's hardening, Pharaoh would not have chosen to keep the 
Israelites enslaved. God can't say to Pharaoh, "you have to live with the 
results of your choices," because Pharaoh can turn around and say, "grant-
ed my previous choices were bad, my choice now wouldn't have been to 
keep them as slaves- that's your doing." The strategy of ascribing respon-
sibility to Pharaoh for his "hardened" choices, if it is adopted at all, has to 
be implemented along very different lines.69 
9. A naturalist account of hardening 
The distinguished biblical scholar Umber to Cassuto (1883-1951) 
explains the expression "God hardened Pharaoh's heart" as follows: 
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In early Hebrew diction, it is customary to attribute every phenome-
non to the direct action of God .... Every happening has a number of 
causes, and these causes, in turn, have other causes, and so on ad 
infinitum; according to the Israelite conception, the cause of all causes 
was the will of God, the Creator and Ruler of the world. Now the 
philosopher examines the long and complex chain of causation, 
whereas the ordinary person jumps instantly from the last effect to 
the first cause, and attributes the former directly to God. This, now, is 
how the Torah, which employs human idioms, expresses itself. 
Consequently the expression 'but I will harden his heart' is, in the 
final analysis, the same as if it were worded: but his heart will be 
hard?O 
For Cassuto, "God hardens people's hearts" is shorthand for "people's 
hearts sometimes become hard." Once hardening is read naturalistically, 
with no implication of divine intervention, the standard problems about 
deprivation of free will, prevention of repentance, and assignment of 
responsibility become non-starters. Hardening, on this view, is not a foml 
of direct divine action. 
Cassuto's position is not as clear as we might like it to be. If God is the 
first cause, does that mean that He initiates a causal sequence that leads to 
Pharaoh's heart becoming hard? If so, a hardened heart is still a manipulat-
ed heart. Cassuto may mean that God is the author of nature. If so, 
Cassuto's naturalist reading of the Bible's language is strikingly like an 
assertion made explicitly by Maimonides in his philosophic magnum opus, 
Guide of the Perplexed. There Maimonides endorses a general thesis that 
when Scripture attributes actions to God it is speaking of natural processes 
and not direct interventions.71 He could thus consider divine hardening to 
be a natural process- indeed would have to, at least at the esoteric level of 
the Guide. 
But the naturalist account, as we have stated it, suffers from an obvious 
weakness. According to the account, Pharaoh's earlier "self-hardenings" 
and God's later" other" -hardenings seem to refer to the same type of event, 
a self-hardening. Why then does the Bible use differing expressions for 
what is allegedly the same type of event? Cassuto replies that "they can be 
interchanged because their essential meaning is identical."72 But why 
would the Bible vary its language at all? Why wouldn't "the ordinary per-
son" of whom Cassuto speaks ascribe all the hardenings to GodT3 
There is a version of the naturalist account that can meet this objection. 
It is offered by an eminent present-day biblical scholar, Nachum Sarna: 
This ['God hardened Pharaoh's heart'] is the biblical way of asserting 
that the king's intransigence has by then become habitual and irre-
versible; his character has become his destiny. He is deprived of the 
possibility of relenting and is irresistibly impelled to his self-wrought 
doom?4 
Sarna's view, as I want to reconstruct it here, interprets "God hardened 
Pharaoh's heart" as follows (the wording is mine): 
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In the natural order of things a person sometimes will make choices 
that later on cause him to disregard incentives against making that 
sort of choice and that deprive him of the possibility of deciding oth-
erwise. Pharaoh's choice not to release the Israelites in the face of 
plague six was due to earlier choices Pharaoh had made, choices that 
caused him to disregard incentives for releasing them and that ren-
dered unavoidable the choice he in fact made, viz., to keep them 
enslaved. 
As in Cassuto's solution, the question of how God could hold Pharaoh 
responsible is now a non-starter. Aristotle held that a person is responsible 
for his or her character if the person's earlier choices led up to that charac-
ter. If we apply an Aristotelian conception of responsibility for character to 
Pharaoh's case, then Pharaoh bears responsibility for hardened acts.75 Bad 
people are held responsible for unavoidable bad acts when their previous 
choices produced those later unavoidable acts. The approach just sketched 
is in flat opposition to Maimonides' idea in Eight Chapters that Pharaoh was 
not punished for his hardened acts. On the contrary: the "hardened" agent 
bears responsibility. But, again, naturalism may be his esoteric teaching.76 
With Sarna's approach in hand, let us return to the problem that con-
fronted Cassuto's: why does the Bible vary its language? The answer to 
this question is that Pharaoh's "self-hardenings" in plagues 1-5 were not 
wholly determined by previous choices he had made. Those choices were 
reversible in the sense that he could choose differently. But from plagues 
six and onward Pharaoh had no choice anymore-hence the shift in the 
Bible's language. Adapting a remark made by Harry Wolfson, we may say: 
God gives every human being the power to sin or not sin (i. e., free will), 
but He does not give every human being the power to repent or not 
repent,77 
A challenge to the new version of naturalism may be marshalled from 
the Bible's description of plague seven-where Pharaoh hardens his own 
heart. If "God's hardened Pharaoh's heart" (plague six) is really another 
way of saying that Pharaoh's previous choices have caused him to keep the 
Israelites enslaved, that his path has become irreversible, and that his char-
acter has become his destiny, why would Pharaoh in plague seven be said 
to harden his own heart, implying (on the present theory) that his path of 
plague six was not irreversible after all? 
The naturalist's answer to this, I suggest, is that although Pharaoh's 
choices in plagues 1-5 made it inevitable that he chose to keep the Israelites 
in plague six, it does not follow that his choice in plague seven is also due 
to his choices in plagues 1-5. Perhaps the incentives in plague seven to 
release the Israelites were greater than those in plague six, and even a per-
son for whom the choice in plague six was inevitable could have acted oth-
erwise in plague seven. No matter how bad a person's character has 
become, there are circumstances in which that character does not by itself 
dictate a bad choice. If we assume further that, in other plagues in which 
God hardened Pharaoh's heart, Pharaoh's obstinacy was a result only of his 
previous choices and that there was no significant change in the power of 
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the incentives produced by the new plague, we can explain the variations 
in the Bible's language. 
Another objection to the naturalistic account is that it renders 
Maimonides' question- how God could harden Pharaoh's heart-a non-
starter. But in the first place, this is not an objection to the account itself, but 
only to an attribution of the account to Maimonides. Furthermore, the 
question is not a non-starter from a naturalist standpoint. Maimonides' ear-
lier claim in chapter five of Laws of Repentance was that a human being 
always has free choice; it is therefore entirely appropriate for him to ask 
why human beings, in the course of nature, occasionally lose free choice 
and the power to repent- why did God set up nature this way? 
The naturalist account, in Sarna's version, has withstood our objections 
thus far. But another problem has to be faced. As we have seen, the Bible 
attributes a motive to God for the hardening, namely, God must manifest 
his full power. But according to the naturalist account, what does it mean 
to ascribe a motive to God? Aren't Pharaoh's "divinely hardened" acts 
explicable without reference to a motive God has for the hardening? And 
how does a divine motive fit in with the account?78 
I suggest that God's "motive" may be fit into the account if we return to 
the full statement in the Talmud we quoted earlier: "when one comes to be 
declared impure, we give him an opening [to impurity]; when one comes to 
be purified, we assist him." Suppose that, although God does not directly 
intervene in any person's motivational system to produce sinful decisions, 
(a) He does directly intervene to produce good decisions when He sees that 
a person is trying to repent and (b) He does this even if the person is trying 
to repent only because he harbors fear. It follows that if Pharaoh wanted to 
release the Israelites- for whatever reason, even fear- then God ordinarily 
would assist him in repenting (by, say, intervening to stifle any inclination 
to slip back into doing the wrong thing). But suppose further that God on 
occasion chooses to withhold assistance because He wants to realize cer-
tain goals, the attainment of which are more valuable to him than the sin-
ner's repenting. In other words, suppose we say that God sometimes with-
holds a kind of assistance He would normally provide. Then we can say of 
Pharaoh something similar to what is said by Wolfson, paraphrasing 
Abraham ibn Daud (ca. 1110-1180): "God did not think of him [Pharaoh] as 
meriting His auxiliary grace in assisting him to turn away from his free 
choice of his evil conduct."79 Departing from Wolfson, I am suggesting that 
God's withholding motivational assistance is a function not only of 
Pharaoh's merit but also a function of God's having the motive of manifest-
ing His power so as to make himself known to the Egyptians and Israelites. 
The withheld-assistance view treats hardening as a nonmiraculous natural 
process, the way things go when there's no divine intervention; only bet-
terment is explained supernaturally. And hardening is basically the with-
holding of assistance. The theory of hardening needs to be accompanied by 
a particular account of betterment.so 
I have suggested that Sarna's version of the naturalist account of hard-
ening can meet the textual objections we have raised, but that, for the 
account to explain the Bible's reference to God's motive, it needs to com-
bine a naturalistic view of the process of hardening with a supernatural 
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account of the process of betterment. Notice, however, that our explanation 
suggests that Pharaoh would have qualified for divine assistance were it 
not for God's desire to manifest His power. Can this be? Typically, better-
ment involves a person soliciting God's help. Pharaoh did not solicit God's 
help in repenting. So why would God have helped him were it not for 
God's desire to manifest His power? 
The smoothest reply to this question would be that an agent's asking 
God for assistance is not a necessary condition of God's assisting that per-
son. Although God would not have helped Pharaoh for the reason that 
Pharaoh would have solicited His help, God would have had another rea-
son to help the king. What is that reason? Simply that the Israelites were 
suffering. In other words, were it not for the motive of manifesting His 
greatness so as to impart knowledge of Himself, God would have bettered 
Pharaoh, for the sake of the Israelites, even if Pharaoh were not to solicit 
His assistance in repenting. 
Inevitably the question arises whether the supernaturalist account of 
betterment can explain why bettered agents are "responsible" for, i. e. 
given credit for, their bettered acts, or whether such an account must, 
instead, deny that hardened agents bear such responsibility. Earlier we 
said that whereas Albo's "bold" attempt to explain hardening failed, an 
analogous approach to betterment, in which betterment is God's removing 
motivational impediments to doing good upon solicitation by the agent, fol-
lowed by the agent's choosing the good, would not fall foul of the hypno-
tist objection that troubled the bold account of hardening. Hence, supernat-
urally bettered agents bear responsibility for their "bettered" acts in those 
cases when the agent asks to be bettered. In cases in which no request is 
made by the agent, the agent may not bear responsibility. So, for example, 
if God were to help Pharaoh repent when Pharaoh does not ask for His 
help (for example, if He were to help him repent only because the Israelites 
were suffering), Pharaoh may not receive credit for this "repentance." So, 
some bettered agents (those who ask for betterment) are responsible for, 
i.e. get moral credit for, "bettered" acts; other bettered agents (those who 
are bettered for other reasons) are not thus responsible. The text does not 
state any of this, but it stands to reason. 
At this point, a final issue must be broached. Can Maimonides accept 
the supernatural account of betterment that we presented as a companion 
to the naturalist view of hardening? Jerome Gellman has cited textual evi-
dence that Maimonides understood betterment in a naturalist fashion. 81 
Gellman does not suggest that something like the hypnotist analogy trou-
bled Maimonides in the case of betterment. Nor does he argue merely from 
the linguistic assertion by Maimonides that "God does X" is to be read nat-
uralistically. Instead Gellman argues that naturalism about betterment 
coheres with Maimonides' religious sensibilities, in particular his notion 
that human beings are "radically responsible" for their destinies. On 
Gellman's reading, Maimonides, for various theological reasons, wanted to 
affirm human independence and strength, the capacity of human beings to 
transform themselves on their own; and he wanted to place responsibility 
for destiny squarely in human hands.82 As a great twentieth-century expli-
cator of Maimonides put it, "in this task [repentance], man must rely upon 
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himself; no one can help him. He is his own creator and innovator. He is 
his own redeemer ... "83 (Pelagianism is no heresy in Judaism.) 
But if the argument I gave earlier is correct, then the naturalist view of 
hardening that best explains the biblical references to God's having a 
motive is one that is accompanied by a supernatural approach to better-
ment- a theory on which, while transformation of personality for the bet-
ter originates in self, it is completed by God. It is questionable whether 
Maimonides can embrace this resolution given his religious sensibilities as 
explained by Gellman. Hence, at the bottom line, the acceptability of the 
"withheld assistance" account of hardening depends on one's religious 
sensibilities concerning the extent to which human beings control their 
character. Some will read Maimonides in a less naturalistic way than 
Gellman, while others, endorsing Gellman's interpretation, will view our 
proposed solution as decidely non-Maimonidean. At the same time, it is 
hard to see what alternative account would meet both philosophical and 
exegetical desiderata. What emerges in any event from any sort of natural-
ist understanding of hardening or betterment is that keeping God to at 
least some extent out of human choice has certain theological advantages.84 
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ment which suggests that Christian thinkers who believe in free will are oblig-
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Thomas V. Morris (Notre Dame, Ind., 1988), 121-50, esp. pp. 124-25. An 
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(Yale U. Press, 1957). 
2. That God intervenes in motivational systems is also suggested by the 
doctrine that God has a plan for history. For a fuller statement of this difficulty 
and a discussion of the narrative of Joseph and his brothers in its light, see 
Shalom Carmy and David Shatz, 'The Bible As a Source for Philosophical 
Reflection," in The Routledge History of Jewish Philosophy, ed. Daniel Frank and 
Oliver Leaman (London, 1996), 13-37, at pp. 25-29. 
3. Relevant references include Exodus 4:21, 7:3, 9:12, 10:1, 20, 27; 11:10; 
14:4,8,17, and arguably 14:5, 18. 
4. Deut. 2:30; Joshua 11:20. 
5. Cf. Paul's statement: "God hardens whom He will" (Romans 9:18). 
6. 1 Kings 18:37. 
7. Saadya Gaon, in his Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. Samuel 
Rosenblatt (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1948), IV, ch. 6, p. 199, 
interprets "strengthened (or hardened) his heart" to mean that he kept 
Pharaoh alive; Isaac Arama (see note 61), that he gave Pharaoh respite between 
plagues. 
8. Saadya Gaon, p. 188. Hardening is among eight scriptural challenges 
that Saadya considers to his views on free will; see pp. 196-294. 
9. Maimonides declares that "no one forces a person or decrees upon him 
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or draws him to one of the two paths; rather he inclines on his own and from 
his own knowledge to one of the two paths." See Mishneh Torah, Book of 
Knowledge, Laws of Repentance, 5:2. For a translation, see Moses Hyamson's edi-
tion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). Maimonides' statement, like 
Saadya's, suggests an incompatibility between divine intervention and free 
willi responsibility; we shall see later whether he truly holds this view. But 
Maimonides, unlike Saaadya, does not hold that God never intervenes in moti-
vational systems. 
10. For surveys of other approaches to hardening in Jewish sources, see 
Harry Austryn Wolfson, Repercussions of the Kalam in Jewish Philosophy 
(Harvard University Press, 1979),200-214; Nechama Leibowitz, Studies in 
Shemot [Exodus], translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman (Jerusalem: World 
Zionist Organization, 1976), 149-60; Yehuda Nachshoni, Studies in the Weekly 
Parasha (Brooklyn: Mesorah Publications, 1988), 361-67. 
11. Elsewhere I have considered and argued against a contemporary solu-
tion to these puzzles of hardening and sanctification, one that recruits Harry 
Frankfurt's "hierarchical" account of freedom to show that hardened agents 
have free will. This strategy is a version of the compatibility thesis we may call 
"H-compatibilism" - that hardening is compatible with free will and moral 
responsibility. See my "Hierarchical Theories of Freedom and the Hardening 
of Hearts", Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXI, ed. H. Wettstein, et. al. (u. of 
Notre Dame, in press). In that paper I discuss Eleonore Stump's stimulating 
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12. Likewise, the free will deprivation problem becomes acute if one 
explains divine hiddenness in a particular way. Suppose that, when asked, 
"why does a good God not provide sufficient, incontrovertible evidence for 
His existence?," a theist answers that were God to reveal himself fully and evi-
dently, people would no longer believe in him freely but would rather be 
coerced into believing. Here again a theist would be assigning a high value to 
free will. For a defense of this sort, see Michael Murray, "Coercion and the 
Hiddenness of God," American Philosophical Quarterly 30(1993):27-38. For criti-
cisms of theistic responses to the problem of hiddenness, see Robert McKim, 
"the Hiddenness of God," Religious Studies 26(1990): 141-61 and J. L. 
Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1993). 
13. See Moses Nahmanides' commentary to Gen. 2:9 and Deut 30:6. 
Nahmanides' position assumes that freedom requires alternative possibilities. 
For a treatment of "automatic goodness" that does not assume this and there-
fore regards right acts as free even in the absence of alternative possibilities, see 
Eleonore Stump, "Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," in 
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, ed. Fischer and Ravizza, 237-62. Cf. my 
"Irresistible Goodness and Alternative Possibilities," in Freedom and Moral 
Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives, edited by Charles Manekin and 
Menachem Kellner (Baltimore, Md., 1997), 33-73. 
14. For some problems in the free will theodicist's evaluations, see Robert 
Merrihew Adams, "Theodicy and Divine Intervention," in The God Who Acts, 
ed. Thomas F. Tracy (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994),31-40. 
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15. Gersonides, in fact, suggests that although God wants to preserve the 
free choice of ordinary human beings, God controls kings' hearts because of the 
impact a wicked king can have on the social order and the course of history. 
See Gersonides' commentary to Proverbs 21:1. In his commentary to Exodus 
7:3, he applies this general notion to Pharaoh's case. 
16. I set the causation problem aside; the philosophers I discuss have little 
to say about it. Aquinas is concerned with causation, however. See Kretzmann, 
"God Among the Causes of Evil." Aquinas's discussion appears in Summa 
Theologica laIIae, Q. 79. 
17. Joseph Albo, The Book of Roots, IV:25, my translation. There is a bilin-
gual edition of this work by Isaac Huzik (Philadelphia, 1929). 
18. The "modest" claim I outline is not as explicit in Albo as in Ovadyah 
Seforno's and Nahmanides's commentaries to Ex. 7:3. However, I take the lib-
erty of expounding Albo in light of those more elaborate statements asserting 
the modest claim. A reader who is troubled by this procedure is welcome to 
substitute Seforno for Albo. 
19. Of course different theorists will flesh out the bold claim differently, 
depending on their favored accounts of free will, but I will stick with Albo's 
conception of free will as involving alternative possibilities. See n. 40 below. 
20. I leave out further complications caused by God's knowing in advance 
that Pharaoh won't repent anyway even if given the opportunity. 
21. See Ex. 7:3, 10:1, 11:9. Seforno incorporates these references into his 
interpretation. But cf. Rashi (Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1040-1105) to 7:3, for a dif-
ferent view of the relationship between hardening and manifestation of power. 
On the theme of "knowledge of God," see, e. g., Ex. 5:2, 6:7, 7:5, 7:17, 8:6, 8:18, 
9:14,9:29, 10:2, 11:7, 14:4, 14:18. The theme continues throughout the Israelites' 
sojourns after the Exodus. 
22. See, e. g., Seforno to Ex. 7:3. 
23. Williams, How Free Does the Will Need to Be? (Lindley lecture, U. of 
Kansas, 1986), p. 2. See also Harry Frankfurt, "Coercion and Moral 
Responsibility," in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays 
(Cambridge University Press, 1988), 80-94, at pp. 44-46; Michael J. Murray and 
David Dudrick, "Are Coerced Acts Free?," American Philosophical Quarterly 
32(1995):109-24. 
24. The example is adapted from Frankfurt, "Coercion and Moral 
Responsibility," 44-46. 
25. I borrow this term from Murray and Dudrick, "Are Coerced Acts 
Free?" 
26. I examine this problem for libertarians in "Irresistible Goodness and 
Alternative Possibilities." 
27. In truth, libertarians confront a stronger challenge: they owe us an 
account of why agents are said to be free even when natural contingencies have 
left them with but one reasonable course. For one libertarian strategy, see my 
"Irresistible Goodness and Alternative Possibilities." Cf. Peter van Inwagen, 
"When Is the Will Free?" Philosophical Perspectives 3, ed. James E. Tomberlin 
(Tascadero, California: Ridgeview, 1989), 399-422. 
28. It is unlikely that God's hardening caused the later self-hardening to 
take place, since God's hardening has to be repeated later. 
29. This is the kind of counterfactual involved in the debate over middle 
knowledge, that is, the debate whether God has knowledge of counterfactuals 
whose truth depends on human free choice. See Robert M. Adams, "Middle 
Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,' in his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays 
(New York, 1987), 77-93. 
30. Later I will raise the possibility that Pharaoh's previous acts are what 
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hardened him, an interpretation that forces me to regard Pharaoh's case not as 
one involving alternative possibilities. But Albo isn't saying that the previous 
acts hardened him. 
31. See Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 86b. 
32. This formulation is suggested by Nachshoni, p. 367. 
33. See, e.g. Berakhot Sa. 
34. Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 86a. 
35. For an exploration of these varied cases, see the discourses of Rabbi 
Joseph B. Soloveitchik that are collected in SolOIJeitchik on Repentance, adapted 
by Pinchas H. Peli, (Paulist Press, 1984), passim.; a good place to focus on is 146-
53. Cf. Norvin Richards, "Forgiveness," Ethics 99, 1 (October 1988): 77-97, pp. 
87-92. The definition of repentance in terms of not repeating the act when 
placed in similar circumstances is found in the Talmud, Yoma 86b; the example 
of the powerless individual is found in Maimonides, Mishllch Torah, Laws of 
Repentance 2:1. Of some importance are textual variants of the Talmud that 
affect whether the criterion of not repeating the act applies to one who does not 
repeat it in one subsequent opportunity (Maimonides) or instead only to one 
who does not repeat it in three subsequent opportunities (as other variants 
suggest). I admit that Albo may not accept these other analyses,and further 
realize that Pharaoh may not satisfy such internal conditions as resolving not 
to repeat the sin. But it is still clear that Alba's formulation is problematic. 
(Eleonore Stump pointed out to me difficulties in the category of repentance 
due to powerlessness, but I will set these aside since the other cases provide 
sufficient trouble for Albo.) 
36. The fatigue factor is central in Stump's analysis of hardening cases in 
"Sanctification ... ". 
37. Cf. Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton University Press, 1987), part 
two. 
38. It may be replied that Pharaoh has not repented, but by this time God 
has manifested His power and so the slaves can be released. But what becomes 
of Alba's concern with ensuring Pharaoh's repentance? And in any case, the 
later hardening at sea (to be discussed in a moment) makes sense only if 
Pharaoh fears future reprisal. 
39. I admit that the later hardening leading to pursuit seems to be part of a 
continuing plan on God's part to get the Egyptians to "know" Him; verses 
14:4, 18 suggest this. But Pharaoh still seems to have attained a level of repen-
tance out of fear even in the absence of this full knowledge. 
40. Alba's apparent assumption that freedom requires alternative possibili-
ties has come under repeated attacks in recent years. The seminal argument 
against alternative possibilities is Harry Frankfurt's" Alternate Possibilities and 
Moral Responsibility." That paper, plus a variety of responses to it, may be 
found in Moral Responsibility, edited by John Martin Fischer (Ithaca: Cornell U. 
Press, 1986), Pt. II. For additional discussion see Perspectives on Moral 
Responsibility, edited by Fischer and Ravizza, pt. 3. It is true that these attacks 
have usually assailed the claim that alternative possibilities are necessary for 
freedom, not the claim that voluntariness plus alternative possibilities is suffi-
cient for freedom. However, once the necessity claim is dropped, it will be 
more natural to hold, in developing the bold claim, that Pharaoh's freedom 
consists in his satisfying certain conditions that will create free will even when 
there are no alternative possibilities. That is the essence of the hierarchical strat-
egy I referred to earlier and have assessed elsewhere. Having said that, I still 
would like to cast Albo's bold solution in terms of alternative possibilities. In 
addition, I will use the alternative possibilities account in my discussion of the 
Maimonidean strategies. 
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41. One may object as follows- a poor objection, I think, but instructive. 
"Suppose Pharaoh were to deliberate between releasing the Israelites and 
keeping them enslaved and then were to decide to release them. The decision 
to release would still be, in Albo's phrase, 'like one that is compelled rather 
than voluntary.' Pharaoh would have released them only to prevent another 
agent (God) from inflicting harm on him and his people. And compliance with 
a threat is unfree compliance. For a person to do A freely, the person must be 
able not merely to do otherwise, but to do otherwise freely. Since if Pharaoh 
were to 'do otherwise' and release the slaves, he would not 'do otherwise' 
freely, therefore he does not freely keep them enslaved either." 
This objection is doubly flawed. First, as we said earlier, acts performed 
under duress may be free rather than unfree. Now it is not in Albo's interest to 
pursue this response; to develop his modest claim he needed to declare that 
acts under duress are unfree. A better response for Albo, therefore, is to deny 
that for S to do A freely, S must be able not merely to do otherwise, but to do 
otherwise without duress. There is merit in this denial. (The issue of whether 
the alternative possibilities must be free actions is discussed by John Martin 
Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control [Blackwell, 1994], 140-
47.) In fact a case can be made that any time a person has two eligible alterna-
tives and selects one, the person acts freely- even when the selected alterna-
tive, taken by itself, is a coerced act. Suppose mugger A approaches Smith and 
threatens him, "rob the Chase bank or I'll kill you." Mugger B approaches 
Smith and threatens the very opposite: "if you rob the Chase bank like mugger 
A said, then I'll kill you." Smith has two alternatives open here-- obey A or 
obey B- and when he chooses to comply with mugger A and not mugger B or 
mugger B and not mugger A, he is making a free choice. A fortiori, if Pharaoh 
opts to release the Israelites due to duress, Pharaoh acts freely, so long as 
another option is eligible. 
42. The problem posed by hypnotists is not confined to cases in which the 
suggestion planted renders a particular outcome at least probable. The excuse 
is effective as long as a causal connection can be established. 
43. At the end of "Hierarchical Theories of Freedom and the Hardening of 
Hearts," however, I suggest that hierarchical theories confront a more trou-
bling form of this objection than Albo does. 
44. This discussion cannot be complete without at least a reference to the 
fact that Maimonides, in another context, sides with Albo! Jewish law requires 
that in order for a writ of divorce (get) to be valid, a husband must voluntarily 
consent to divorce his wife. However, in cases where the sages regarded the 
divorce as mandatory, the husband may be compelled by a court to grant the 
get. "But," Maimonides queries, "why is the divorce not invalidated" if it is 
compelled? His answer basically, is that the husband's deeper will is to obey 
the law, which requires him to issue the divorce, but "his evil inclination over-
came him." The court pressure removes the "alien" desire not to divorce her. 
See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Divorce, 2:20. Maimonides' reasoning resembles 
closely the reasoning of those who champion "positive liberty," though it isn't 
clear whether he is asserting that all Israelites "really" want to obey the law. 
One could argue that the fact the agent is here being made to act rightly is rele-
vant to the status of the resulting act as free; but in what follows I argue that 
betterment is different from hardening only if the person being bettered solicits 
the other agent's intervention, which is not the case in the passage at hand. So 
there is a tension between the position I think Maimonides would take vis-a-
vis Albo's bold claim and the position he takes in the divorce passage, and I do 
not know how to resolve it. 
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even though the midwives had refused to cooperate with a previous decree to 
kill newborn males. That the baby Moses had to be hidden (chapter 2) suggests 
what one would infer anyway, to wit, that male Hebrew infants were in dan-
ger after Pharaoh issued a decree to drown them. 
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Soncino, 1977). 
53. Ibid., 11:1. See also 5:7. 
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English translation in Ethical Writings of Maimonides, edited by Raymond L. 
Weiss and Charles Butterworth (New York, 1975),89-94. 
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scientific determinism. See Alexander Altmann, "Free Will and Predestination 
in Saadia, Bahya, and Maimonides," repro in Altmann, Essays in Jewish 
Intellectual History (Hanover, New Hampshire: New England University Press, 
1981), 35-63; Shlomo Pines, "Notes on Maimonides' Views Concerning Free 
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His Time, ed. Eric Ormsby (Washington, D. c.: Catholic University Press, 1989); 
and, most recently, Josef Stern, "Maimonides' Compatibilist Conceptions of 
Freedom and the Sense of Shame," in Manekin and Kellner, pp. 217-66. 
57. This translation is from Weiss and Butterworth, 90. 
58. I may be overstating the differences between Eight Chapters and Laws of 
Repentance: Maimonides may not really have something different in mind. But 
for analytical purposes it is worth treating the ideas of free will as punishment 
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59. For discussion of the related but distinct view held by Aquinas, see 
Kretzmann, "God Among the Causes of Evil," 198ff. See also Murray, 
"Coercion and the Hiddenness of God," pp. 35-37. Maimonides extends his 
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explanation to cover Sihon's punishment as well. As proof of his approach, he 
cites God's statement to Isaiah: 
Make the heart of this people fat, make their ears heavy, and shut 
their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, hear with their ears, and under-
stand with their heart, and [thus] will return [repent] and be healed. (Is. 
6:10). 
60. There is another difference between Albo and Maimonides, relating to 
the purpose of the plagues. Maimonides seems to consider the later plagues to 
be punishments for earlier misdeeds. He admits that we do not know why 
God elects to punish Pharaoh in one particular way, viz., by preventing him 
from repenting, rather than in some other way. This is simply the punishment 
that God thought was most fitting and just. For Albo, all the later plagues are 
attempts to give him an opportunity to repent properly (by seeing God's 
power). 
61. The objection sketched in this paragraph is developed by Isaac Arama 
(1420-94) in his commentary Akedat Yitzhak, Exodus, ch. 36. An English adapta-
tion of this chapter, omitting some details of Arama's critique of Maimonides, is 
found in Eliyahu Munk, Aqaydat Yitzchaq (Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1986),347-60. 
62. Arama also instances Ahab and Menashe (I Kings 16, 21; II Kings 21; II 
Chronicles 33). 
63. For a study that incorporates much of the relevant literature, see, Joram 
Haber, Forgiveness (Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991). 
64. Quoted by Carl Reinhold Brakenhielm, Forgiveness, trans. Thor Hall 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1987), p. 11. Maimonides cannot handle this prob-
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between sins that make repentance hard and sins that cause repentance to be 
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category (See Laws of Repentance, 4:6) But his language vis-a-vis Pharaoh sug-
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65. Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik stresses this distinction in his discourses on 
repentance. See Solovcitchik on Repentance, passim .. 
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For an individual cannot but sin and err, either through ignorance--
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individual believed that this fracture can never be remedied, he would 
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Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines [u. of Chicago, 1963], pt. 111, ch. 36, p. 540.) 
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unfreely now when he takes drugs even if there were previous moments at 
which he took drugs freely and those earlier choices shaped his present will. So 
it may be preferable to hold that Pharaoh is responsible for his later acts even 
though he does not perform them freely; and the naturalist position can and 
maybe should maintain as much- adding, however, that, if Pharaoh lost his 
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free will, that loss is his own responsibility. 
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see chapter 4 of Laws of Repentance. In the Talmud, Ben Azzai points out that 
people become drawn into patterns of behavior: "a good deed leads to another 
good deed, a transgression to another transgression" (Avot 4:2). While his state-
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opportunities for good or bad deeds based on a person's earlier choices, ben 
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77. Wolfson, Repercussions, 210-11. 
78. Sarna writes on p. 36, in his comment to Ex. 7:3: "I utilize his stubborn-
ness in order to demonstrate my active presence." This of course is not the 
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God's words to imply that multiplication of wonders is the motive for harden-
ing: "To the Egyptians, the multiplication of these 'signs' enhances the evi-
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79. Wolfson, Repercussions, 208. See Abraham Ibn Daud, Emunah Ramah 
(The Exalted Faith) II:6:2. See also Aquinas's discussion in Summa Theologica 
IaIIae, Q79, a. 4. 
80. See also Leibowitz, Aquinas. 
81. See Gellman, "Radical Responsibility." Maimonides' view is a bit con-
fusing as to whether betterment is parallel to naturalistic hardening. When 
David prayed, "Uphold me with a willing spirit" (Psalms 51:4), he meant, "let 
not my sins prevent me from repenting. Instead the choice may be in my hands 
so that I may return, understand, and know, the way of truth. And so for all 
similar verses." David is not asking that God interfere with his soul, but only, 
in Gellman's words, that "his past sins not be allowed to prevent his own initi-
ation of turning in the direction of God." But this construal of David's words 
invites the question of why David's past sins would stand in the way if he is 
really like a hardened agent. On the contrary his past right choices should 
deterministically produce future right choices, just as a hardened agent's past 
choices determine his present ones. Gellman's reference to "David's own initia-
tion" suggests something other than a right choice produced by past right 
ones.(See Gellman, "Radical Responsibility," 252-54; the quote about King 
David's request is his translation of Laws of Repentance 6:4. 0. Saadya Gaon, p. 
202.) 
Eleonore Stump pointed out to me that if God directly assists people 
not to sin, this would make the problem of evil look even more difficult. That is 
another reason to construe betterment naturalistically, I think. 
82. For a similar account of Maimonides' religious sensibility, see David 
Hartman, Maimonides: Torah and Philosophic Quest (Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publication Society, 1976). 
83. Soloveitchik, as adapted by Peli in Soloveitchik on Repentance, 182. See 
also Howard 1. Levine, "The Experience of Repentance: The Views of 
Maimonides and William James," Tradition 1, 1 (Fall 1958):40-63. It is easy to 
see that a naturalist account of betterment accords nicely with a naturalist 
analysis of hardening. For if there is no divine assistance in the process of bet-
terment, then psychological regularities and habit reign fully over the human 
personality. If so, then not everyone can repent after all: some people are too 
far gone to "return" even if they would want to. Belief in repentance must not 
encourage the false hope that change for the better is always possible, because 
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